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Abstract  
 
Georgia is the only country in the post-Soviet region where incarceration rates 
significantly grew in the 2000s. Did this punitiveness and its sudden relaxation 
after 2012 impact attitudes to the law? We find that these attitudes remained 
negative regardless of levels of punitiveness. Furthermore, the outcomes of 
sentencing may be less important than procedures leading to sentencing. 
Procedural justice during both punitiveness and liberalization was not assured. 
This may explain the persistence of negative attitudes to law. The Georgian case 
shows that punitive turns or politically-driven mass amnesties are unlikely to solve 
the problem of legal nihilism in the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Law-breaking was a major issue that preoccupied scholars of the former 
Soviet Union directly after the Soviet collapse (Lotspeich 1995; Frisby 1998; 
Chervyakov et al. 2002; Galeotti 2002; Karstedt 2003; Kim & Pridemore 2006). 
There were huge increases in many forms of crime throughout the 1990s across 
the former Soviet Union (see Zvekic 1998). Yet, throughout the 2000s, the most 
egregious forms of violent criminal activity such as homicide, violent assault and 
the prevalence of organized crime appeared to decline in countries such as 
Russia and the Baltic States. In these countries, this decline has occurred without 
the emergence of an overt politics of crime. That is to say, crime control did not 
become a fixating object of government intervention, a contentious electoral 
issue or a means for governing a wide array of social problems (Garland 2001; 
Simon 2007). Moreover, there was no ‘punitive turn’ in response to the crime 
issue – incarceration rates have declined across the entire post-Soviet region 
from their level in 2000.  
There is one exception to this general trend and that is post-Soviet 
Georgia. A punitive shift, framed in terms of ‘zero tolerance,’ clearly emerged in 
2004 following the Rose Revolution and the rise to power of the United National 
Movement (UNM) under Mikheil Saakashvili. Georgia was alone in the post-
Soviet region in joining many Western countries in a trend, noticeable since the 
1990s, of what has been described as ‘the new punitiveness’ (Pratt et al. 2013; 
Baker & Roberts 2013). This punitive turn is most straightforwardly measured 
by the increase in incarceration by 300% between 2003-2010, remaining high 
(within the top ten in the world per capita) until the UNM left power in 2012 
despite some efforts at liberalization of the system after 2009 (International 
Centre for Prison Studies 2004-2012; Slade 2012; 2013). During this punitive 
turn, crime also rapidly decreased. Victimization surveys from 2010 and 2011 
show that Georgia had become an incredibly safe place to live in international 
comparison (Georgian Opinion Research Business International, hereafter GORBI 
2011). During this time, Saakashvili described Georgia as a ‘laboratory for 
reform’ in which a ‘mental revolution’ had taken place regarding attitudes to the 
state (Brookings Institute 2011). Indeed, at times criminal justice policy in 
Georgia resembled an experiment. Following the UNM’s departure from 
government in 2012, punitiveness was significantly decreased. The new 
incoming Georgian Dream coalition almost halved the prison population within a 
few months and sentencing policies were liberalized. 
The goal of this paper is to understand how these turns towards and away 
from punitiveness have impacted on Georgian attitudes to the law and law-
abidingness. We first discuss the literature on legal nihilism, zero tolerance and 
punitiveness and introduce the Georgian case in more detail. We then investigate 
three theoretical propositions derived from the literature: 
 
 Zero tolerance improves attitudes to law by reducing discretion, 
signaling the credibility of law enforcement, and inducing respect 
for the supremacy of the law through uncompromising sanctions 
for all lawbreakers.  
 Levels of punitiveness must chime with popular beliefs about 
acceptable punishment to affect positive feelings towards the law. 
 Direct experiences of criminal justice are vital in shifting attitudes 
to the law.  
 
In the Georgian case, we find little support for the first two propositions, but 
more support for the third. We conclude that the Georgian case suggests that 
punitiveness is not a remedy for the legal nihilism of the post-Soviet region. 
However, leniency also appears to make little difference. Instead, Georgia’s 
experience indicates the salience of the arguments for procedural justice, both in 
the everyday application of the law, and in the making of that law. 
 
Legal Nihilism and Zero Tolerance 
 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, a particularly strong vein of 
scholarship identified legal culture in former Soviet countries as a potential 
source of criminal behavior (Solomon 1997; Ledeneva 1998; 2006; Humphreys 
2002; Galligan & Kurkchiyan 2003; Nethercott 2007). Essentially, negative 
attitudes to law facilitated activity which broke that law. Such negative attitudes 
possibly emerged from historical disregard for formal rules emanating from an 
aloof state that broke these rules with abandon as well as low levels of legal 
literacy (Hendley 2000; 2012). Legal nihilism, an academic term, entered the 
policy lexicon as an obstacle to the rule of law and one root cause among others 
of pernicious phenomena from corruption to anti-social behavior. 
Hendley (2012: 150) defines legal nihilism as referring to ‘a lack of 
respect for law…legal nihilists obey the law when convenient, and otherwise 
ignore it.’ A number of scholars have shown that legal nihilism is not as 
widespread as is often thought, at least in the case of Russia (Hendley 1999; 
2000; 2012; Gibson 2003; Gans-Morse forthcoming). Yet, scholars of Georgia 
often characterized Georgian legal consciousness in terms of nihilism. For 
example, Nordin & Glonti (2006) argued that Georgians automatically resisted 
law in its various forms. Kukhianidze (2003; 2009) suggested Georgians suffered 
from an acute form of ‘alienated statehood’ in which social norms always 
overcame any sense of obligation to state law. This seemingly followed from a 
historic disregard for the rule of law. The countries of the Caucasus region 
during Soviet times were regarded as particularly deviant (Law 1974; Friedgut 
1976; Sampson 1987). Various estimates suggested that Georgia, proportionate 
to its size, had one of the biggest, if not the biggest, second economy in the Soviet 
Union (Feldbrugge 1989; Suny 1994; Grossman 1977; 1998; Alexeev & Pyle 
2003).  
Some argued that this was a result of cultural traits (Mars and Altman 
1983). On top of the legal alienation fostered by Soviet political theory, the pre-
modern, familial networks of the Georgian economy, largely agricultural in 
nature, framed exchange and social relationships outside of legal frameworks. 
Informal practices became even more prevalent in the ‘time of troubles’ of the 
early 1990s (Zurcher 2005). Informal institutions became key mechanisms for 
economic survival and physical safety in the context of separatist conflicts and 
civil war (Round and Williams 2010; Kupatadze 2012). Eduard Shevardnadze, 
the former Soviet Foreign Minister and Georgian President from 1992-2003, 
managed to establish some political order toward the mid-1990s but himself 
relied on informal practices of cooptation and bargaining to survive in power 
(Christophe 2004; Godson et al. 2004; Nodia 2005). Under Shevardnadze crime 
control was mainly confined to instrumentalising anti-corruption as a tool for 
political purposes, using it to punish political dissenters and blackmail potential 
rivals (Stefes 2006). By 2003, Georgia’s scores for control of corruption and 
citizen’s feelings of safety were abysmal and some of the worst in the post-Soviet 
region (Slade 2012). Moreover, survey data from 2003 and 2004 show that 
scores for trust in law enforcement were some of the lowest for any institutions 
(International Republican Institute 2003; 2004). Georgians had no faith in the 
law.   
In 2004, with Shevardnadze gone and the UNM coming to power, a major 
goal of reform was to fight corruption and crime in the country. In late 2005 and 
early 2006, the UNM declared a policy of ‘zero tolerance’ that involved significant 
change to the criminal justice system (Slade 2012; Strakes 2013; Kupatadze 
2016). ‘Zero tolerance’ has become a frequently  used term around the world for 
‘get tough’ policies (see Bowling 1999; Bowling & Sheptycki 2012). It first 
referred to a policing strategy adopted in New York City in the 1990s (Greene 
1999). This strategy had many tactical elements, but its fundamental principle 
was quite simple. According to Willie Bratton, the author of the policy in New 
York, crime and disorder emerge from minor crimes and neglect being allowed 
to fester in communities; this was the central premise of ‘broken windows 
theory’ (Wilson & Kelling 1982). Thus, by targeting petty crime the police can 
create an inhospitable environment for criminal and anti-social behaviour 
(Bratton 1997; Nelson et al. 1997; Greene 1999). In the US context, zero 
tolerance is now associated with other aspects of a punitive approach to crime 
such as ‘three strikes’ laws, truth in sentencing and mandatory minimum 
initiatives. 
Saakashvili’s version of zero tolerance, declared in 2006, first and 
foremost involved directing a reformed police force towards active and targeted 
intervention applying non-discretionary penalties and extraordinary powers, 
such as the use of lethal force against those resisting arrest. But zero tolerance 
was also broader than that and crucially included changes to sentencing policy. 
In Saakashvili’s own words from March 2006: ‘I am announcing a new draft law 
with zero tolerance for petty crimes…There will be no probation 
sentences…Everyone who commits these crimes will go to prison’ (Slade et al. 
2014: 12). As a result of these sentencing changes and the vastly more efficient 
police and prosecutors, the prison population grew from around 6,000 to 24,000 
people, a 300% increase in seven years (2003-2010) and Georgia was in the top 
five incarcerators in the world per capita by 2010.  
It is fair to describe Georgia’s criminal justice between 2004 and 2012 as 
punitive. Punitiveness is a complex and abstract concept, yet it can be measured 
in a variety of ways. These include inflexibility in the application of the law, 
severity of deprivation suffered by those punished, or the simple probability of 
punishment for law-breaking (Lynch 1988). Despite these multifarious 
indicators, there is some agreement (see Garland 2001; Frost 2006; Campbell 
2015) that deprivation of freedom is inherent to state punitiveness in the 
present day. Thus, as Frost (2006) and others (see Campbell 2015) argue 
incarceration rates, while imperfect, give a relatively reliable proxy measure of a 
state’s punitiveness for purposes of comparison.  
On this measure, the Georgian state remained punitive throughout 
Saakashvili’s time in office. Saakashvili was re-elected president in 2008 after 
snap elections were called following the violent dispersal of peaceful opposition 
demonstrations in November 2007. There was growing concern, domestically 
and internationally, about the high levels of incarceration and police violence in 
the country at this time (Kupatadze 2012). A ‘liberalization’ of the criminal 
justice system was declared in 2009. This had many good intentions. A new 
criminal procedural code promised to curb police excesses, diversion 
programmes and investment in probation and alternatives to imprisonment 
were made. However, again using incarceration rates as a proxy for punitiveness, 
the situation only stabilized. The prison population stopped growing, but it did 
not decrease between 2009 and 2012. On top of the 24,000-strong prison 
population, 38,000 people were also in the growing probation system. There is 
evidence that torture continued and perhaps worsened in the prison system 
(Slade et al. 2014). Thus, ‘zero tolerance’ was never officially relaxed until 2012. 
Under zero tolerance crime also dramatically declined. A person was 
twice as likely to be a victim of burglary, four times more likely to be robbed and 
10 times more likely to be assaulted in Germany than in Georgia by 2010 
(European Society of Criminology 2012). Walking on the street at night in 
Georgia’s cities became safe and surveys suggested that feelings of security 
improved significantly (Slade 2012; GORBI 2011). Perceptions of corruption 
improved quickly. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
shows that outside the Baltic States, Georgia is now perceived as the least 
corrupt of all post-Soviet countries by its own citizens. It has even surpassed 
European Union members such as Italy and Greece (Slade 2012; Light 2014; 
Kukhianidze 2009; Kupatadze 2012).  
It would make sense to ascribe these declines in crime and corruption to 
the probability of prosecution, the credibility of reformed law enforcement 
bodies, and the increased severity of punishment. However, a further argument 
was made both by the Saakashvili government and international observers. The 
essence of this argument is that from punitiveness positive legal consciousness 
can follow; strict application of tough sanctions for all law-breakers produces 
respect for the supremacy of the law and is a first step to shifting consciousness. 
Thus, Georgian interior minister, Ivane Merabishvili, suggested that the rule of 
law ‘needs to become entrenched tradition, recognised by Georgian society as a 
whole…for the time being…it is the government that is best equipped to 
administer justice’ (The Economist 2008). The World Bank argued that Georgia’s 
fight against corruption successfully prioritized prosecutorial action over and 
above institution building. Using ‘unconventional solutions’ – that is, avoiding 
due process – and utilizing strong-arm tactics to signal credibility, the World 
Bank suggests, was an important step in creating legal order in Georgia and 
could be replicable in other contexts (World Bank 2012).  
Beyond this, Saakashvili and his team declared a ‘mental revolution’ time 
and again, for example in Washington DC at the Brookings Institute (2011) and 
in different appearances at the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly 
(Civil.ge 2010; Council of Europe 2013). The phrase, ‘mental revolution’ was in 
fact borrowed from a positive analysis of Georgia’s reforms in The Economist 
magazine (2008). The essence of this shift in mentality is summed up by 
Saakashvili himself: ‘fundamental reforms and a mental revolution have changed 
Georgia…In particular, as a result of the complete renovation of law enforcement 
bodies…Georgians have stopped thinking of their country as a post-Soviet state’ 
(Civil.ge 2010). The term ‘mental revolution’ expresses renewed engagement 
with the state, active citizen participation, positive orientations to law and its 
institutional manifestations, and an end to passivity and fatalism. 
In 2012, a new government known as Georgian Dream won 
parliamentary elections, in part due to public abhorrence at torture scandals 
revealed on social media in the burgeoning prison system. This new government 
sought to distance itself from its predecessor by relaxing zero tolerance and 
implementing an amnesty of those imprisoned under it. In late 2012 and early 
2013, a wide-ranging release of prisoners was underway. Over 8,000 people 
were amnestied and by the end of 2013 Georgia had slipped back down to 63rd in 
the world in terms of the number of prisoners per capita. The new government 
claimed that it was reacting to popular demand to end the harsh criminal justice 
policies of the Saakashvili government and to relegitimate the judiciary (Slade et 
al. 2014). On this account, greater leniency and discretion was needed in the 
system to chime with popular demands regarding punitiveness, without which 
attitudes to the law and law enforcement would worsen.  
Criminological research (Roberts 2002; Roberts et al. 2003; Frost 2010; 
Campbell 2015) has approached variation in state punitiveness by focusing on 
the interaction between public demands, political agendas, and media 
campaigns. This has led to a debate concerning ‘popular punitiveness’ (Campbell 
2015: 180). This term refers the degree to which political turns towards or away 
from punitiveness are responses to pre-existing dispositions and fear of crime 
(Innes 2004) among the electorate itself. While certainly politically expedient, 
the Georgian Dream’s policy of leniency was framed as driven by the electorate 
and a democratic move that focused on legitimacy-building.   
Thus, both the UNM and Georgian Dream wanted to make important 
claims about the interactions between state punitiveness and attitudes to law in 
the country. On the one hand, zero tolerance can create positive legal 
consciousness – a ‘mental revolution’ - through revealing the irresistible power 
of non-discretionary and efficient application of the law. On the other hand, 
when leniency chimes more with popular preferences, policies that speak to 
those preferences can legitimate state law. This paper seeks to investigate these 
two propositions. They are important suppositions given the continuing 
problems of high crime rates, corruption and nihilistic legal cultures in many 
post-Soviet countries. Saakashvili has declared ‘zero tolerance’ once more in his 
new role as governor of Odessa, Ukraine (Rekhviashvili 2015). Georgian reforms 
have been examined and Georgian reformers employed from nearby Azerbaijan 
to faraway Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
We find that there is little to support either proposition in the data that 
we examine. This leads us to ask why this is. We move away from macro-level 
policies and political signals of punitiveness to micro-level interactions between 
citizens and the state in the field of criminal justice. When citizens experience 
procedural justice – defined as such goods as transparency, neutrality, voice and 
respect in their interactions with the law - legitimacy for its fundamental 
coercive force is nurtured (Tyler 1990; Sunshine & Tyler 2003). The outcome of 
the procedure, even if undesirable for an individual, will not negatively affect 
views of the law if those procedures are just. These propositions have been 
tested and supported in many jurisdictions, including the UK (Jackson et al. 
2012a; 2012b; Singer 2013), Ghana (Tankebe 2008), Jamaica (Reisig and Lloyd 
2009), Slovenia (Reisig, Tankebe and Mesko 2014), and South Africa (Bradford 
et al. 2014). These studies corroborate the hypothesis that citizens’ views of law 
are contingent upon procedural fairness, bringing about a moral sense of 
obligation to law-following. Finally, then the paper will ask what evidence there 
is for this in the case of Georgia and whether procedural (in)justice can help 
explain the persistence of the ‘negative myth of law’ (Kurkchiyan 2003) in the 
country.  
 
Data 
  
The data for this paper come from two rounds of opinion surveys in 2011 
and 2014. As part of the Judicial Independence and Legal Empowerment Project 
(JILEP), under the auspices of the East West Management Institute (EWMI), the 
social research NGO Caucasus Research Resource Centers Georgia Office (CRRC) 
conducted polls of attitudes to the judiciary (cited as EWMI 2011 & 2014). This 
research included repeated nationally representative public opinion surveys as 
well as focus group discussions with three target groups: the general public, 
court users and legal professionals in Tbilisi, Batumi and Kutaisi, as well as 
qualitative and quantitative interviews and surveys with legal professionals and 
business representatives. The surveys were conducted in exactly the same way 
by the same team and using the same measures in both years. The study in 2014 
intended to trace changes in the knowledge and attitudes towards the justice 
system over a two-year period in Georgia and used the same research design to 
achieve this. The survey targeted all Georgian and Russian-speaking adults in 
Georgia. Overall, 3,814 people were interviewed using the face-to-face PAPI 
(Paper and Pencil Interviewing) method in 2014 and 4,308 were interviewed in 
2011. The sampling was representative to Georgia (excluding the breakaway 
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia).   
In particular, we were interested in questions from the surveys and focus 
groups that focused on trust in legal institutions. Moreover, we looked at 
questions of moral obligations to follow the law. In both rounds of the EWMI 
surveys, respondents are asked what constitutes being a good citizen. They are 
presented with a list of eight options and can choose only three. One option is 
‘obey the law’.1 While this is a thin measure of ‘moral alignment’ with the law or 
‘positive legal consciousness,’ it allows an imperfect measure of the degree to 
which respondents hold law-abidingness as important for civic ‘goodness’. This 
allowed some basic tests of relationships between interaction with criminal 
justice and a belief in law-following as an obligation. In what follows, we utilize 
analyses of the survey and focus group data with other data sources including 
from the police, the Ministry of Corrections and public opinion surveys. The 
latter include two victimization surveys carried out on behalf of the Ministry of 
Justice in 2010 and 2011 (GORBI 2010; 2011), a survey on punitiveness by Penal 
Reform International (2009), a 2014 survey of prisoners and ex-prisoners by 
Open Society Georgian Foundation (Slade et al. 2014) and voter opinion polls 
from various years conducted on behalf of international organizations.  
 
Attitudes to Law under Zero Tolerance 
 
                                                 
1 The other options are: help the poor, do volunteer work, vote in elections, vote for 
the ruling party, follow traditions, participate in protests, and form opinions 
independently of others. 
Trust in the institutions of the judiciary has been among the lowest of any 
institutions in Georgia since independence (International Republican Institute 
2003; Stefes 2006; Slade 2013). Survey data from before and after the period in 
which zero tolerance was announced in late 2005 shows that trust in the 
judiciary declined around this time from an already relatively low level when 
Saakashvili came to power. In October 2004, a minority of respondents (44%) 
saw the court system favourably. This had declined to 34% in April 2006. It had 
spiraled to 22% by September 2007 (see Graph One; IRI 2004-2007). A similar 
trend can be noted for prosecutors. By 2011, the EWMI surveys showed that the 
courts, judges and prosecutors were the least trusted institutions in the country; 
only NGOs scored worse.  
 
GRAPH ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
There was one exception to this negative picture. The Georgian police are 
easily the most trusted criminal justice institution: 66% ‘completely trusted’ or 
‘trusted’ the police in 2011. The police were completely overhauled in 2004-
2006. The reforms involved a huge turnover of personnel, the creation of new 
divisions, such as the community oriented Patrol Police, and new uniforms and 
technology (Kupatadze, Siradze and Mitagvaria 2007; Light 2014). The creation 
of this police force was one of the things that Georgians were most satisfied with 
in their government as well as the fight against corruption and the lower crime 
rates (IRI 2007). 
However, despite the high levels of trust reported in the police Georgians 
display very low willingness to report crime (GORBI 2010; 2011). Georgians 
most frequently cite the police’s ineffectiveness in helping them as a reason not 
to turn to the police. This skepticism is complemented by the fact that 11% of 
Georgians state a fear of reprisals as a reason for not turning to the police 
(GORBI 2011). For comparison, this figure stands at less than 1% when scores on 
this question are averaged in European Union nations utilizing data from 
international victimization surveys. This fear of reprisals relates to the fact that a 
greater percentage of people in the EWMI survey in 2011 give ‘following 
traditions’ as a citizen’s duty compared to ‘obeying the law’. Traditional 
understandings of conflict resolution, normative codes of honour and customary 
law compete with state law still.  
Saakashvili and the United National Movement were elected in the wake 
of an electoral corruption scandal. The electorate certainly demanded a fight 
against corruption and cleaner politics, including disentangling political elites 
from mafia bosses and reducing the power of local warlords (Areshidze 2007; 
Kupatadze 2012). It is not clear however that such demands extended to a zero 
tolerance approach to all types of crime. Polling data from 2003, 2004 and 2005, 
show that crime was not viewed as anywhere near as pressing an issue as the 
other mammoth tasks facing the country such as unemployment and separatism 
(International Republican Institute 2003; 2004; 2005). The zero tolerance 
policies concerning police powers and sentencing were rather executive-driven, 
emerging from the anti-corruption struggle (Tangiashvili & Slade 2014). There 
seems to have been a degree of political expediency and ‘elite punitiveness’ that 
led to the adoption of zero tolerance (Beckett 1997; Slade 2013; Tangiashvili & 
Slade 2014).  
Survey data complements this interpretation. Punitiveness is not 
particularly popular among the Georgian population. Penal Reform International 
South Caucasus office (PRI) conducted a survey in 2009 that demonstrated that 
54% of the population believed that punishments were too severe and unjust at 
that time. In contrast, around 32% were in favour of strict punishment for 
offenders (PRI 2009: 11). The same survey showed that the majority of 
Georgians would like to see alternative sentences for minor crimes. Moreover, 
69% thought that the prison population, the fourth largest in the world per 
capita at that time, was ‘too large’. Further evidence for a lack of popular 
punitiveness comes from the EWMI attitudes to the judiciary survey in 2011. 
This shows that most (65%) of people would like to see the circumstances of the 
individual taken into account during sentencing rather than the simple, strict 
application of the law. This preference increased to 69% in 2014. This 
preference is a straightforward rejection of the mandatory custodial sentencing 
principle where judges are given little discretion to take circumstances into 
account.  
In summary, zero tolerance policies did not shift attitudes to the law in 
the abstract or to legal institutions significantly. In regard to the judiciary, these 
policies are correlated with declining trust. Moreover, low levels of willingness 
to report crime offset gains in trust in the police. Finally, zero tolerance appeared 
to go against popular demand for punitiveness among the Georgian population. 
This was despite the fact that the Rose Revolution of 2003 had initially been 
instigated by protest against corruption and criminal behavior. When the 
Georgian Dream came to power in 2012, punitiveness was reduced in line with 
popular sentiment – did this shift relegitimate the criminal justice system? 
 Popular Leniency?  
 
The mass amnesty of more than 8,000 prisoners in 2013 under the 
Georgian Dream was a direct response to ‘unpopular punitiveness’. This move 
was an answer to protest against the criminal justice system that had directly 
affected the 2012 parliamentary election results. The amnesty can therefore be 
seen as not purely elite-driven. This should be positive for legal consciousness as 
Georgians who see their political system as ‘democratic’ are also more likely to 
express a duty to obey the law (EWMI 2011; 2014). We now consider whether 
the dovetailing of levels of punitiveness with public sentiment coincided with 
improving measures of trust in law enforcement and obligations to follow the 
law. 
Attitudes in 2014 showed little improvement to those in 2011. Around 
41% of respondents in 2014 suggested that there was only a slight improvement 
in criminal justice and 32% claimed that everything was just the same. There is 
little change in results concerning the obligation to follow the law between 2011 
and 2014. Around 55% believed innocent people are imprisoned ‘often’ or 
‘occasionally’ in 2014 just as in 2011. Numbers of court users reporting that their 
experience in court had ended with a ‘completely illegitimate’ court ruling got 
worse. As we discuss below, analysis of the 2014 survey showed that, as in 2011, 
there were significant relationships between these indicators and the feeling of 
duty to obey the law.  
Analyzing focus group data from 2014 of those who had had most direct 
experience of court - court users - shows that this group was the most 
unconvinced as to whether the courts had become trustworthier. Most thought 
that nothing had changed. Some complained that there had been no turnover of 
staff in the system. Indeed, during the mass amnesty in 2013 the same courts and 
judges reassessed sentences that they themselves had passed only recently, 
coming to different conclusions in most cases. This only reinforced the notion 
that judges were impotent and subordinate to politics. Thus, trust in judges 
remained low – the third lowest ranked institution of any in both the 2011 and 
2014 survey.  
The amnesty in itself was a contentious procedure. Firstly, a list was 
drawn up of political prisoners who were to be released prior to the mass 
reappraisal of cases of ordinary prisoners. The process for doing this created 
controversy amid claims of political partisanship. Secondly, the review of cases 
of ordinary prisoners was done in a rushed manner; thousands of cases were 
reappraised in just a couple of months. Thirdly, prisoners were often 
unceremoniously removed from prison with no forewarning and no preparation 
for release. Long-term reforms to sentencing and alternatives to prison took 
second stage to the amnesty. Procedurally, even during this period of clemency 
and leniency, the justice system could be perceived as unjust. 
To compound matters, signal crimes - those that elicit fear of crime and 
are interpreted as indicators of levels of risk regardless of how accurate this is 
(Innes 2004) - since the amnesty, made the judiciary look even more 
incompetent. For example, two police officers were shot dead and another badly 
wounded in two separate incidents after the amnesty in 2013 (Lomsadze 2015). 
Furthermore, a spate of high profile murders of businessmen led to the 
impression that disorder was once again returning (Ibid). ‘Special police checks’ 
were set up in Tbilisi seemingly to tackle rising insecurity. Moreover, prison 
disturbances in 2014 were allegedly resolved only with the help of Georgian 
mafia figures - so called ‘thieves-in-law’. Regardless of this moral panic about the 
mass amnesty, there is little official evidence that former prisoners turned to 
crime after release. According to a report of the Ministry of Corrections and Legal 
Assistance, 8,729 individuals were released from Georgian prisons on the basis 
of mass amnesty (Ministry of Corrections 2013). Only 523 (6.1%) of those 
released individuals committed crimes in 2013 and only 423 (4.8%) committed 
crimes in the first 10 months of 2014 (Fact Check Georgia 2014).  
Some indicators for the courts did improve in the 2014 survey. In 2011, 
28% of respondents agreed or fully agreed with the idea that judges were 
independent in Georgia; this had increased to 35% in 2014, a statistically 
significant increase. This result is still problematic when we consider the role 
prosecutors play. In 2014, trust in prosecutors remained incredibly low – only 
16% ‘fully trust’ them. Focus group respondents said the same things in 2014 as 
in 2011 – the judges are ‘puppets’ of the prosecutors. However, trust in courts 
did increase in the period 2011-2014. In 2014, 37% of respondents said that 
they either ‘fully trust’ or ‘partially trust’ the courts, up from 32% in 2011. Yet, 
while this difference is statistically significant, and may have been caused in part 
by the mass amnesty and abandonment of zero tolerance, these are still very low 
figures compared to other institutions such as trust in the patrol police, 
parliament, president, army or church.  
The police’s positive image meanwhile has been declining since the 
change of government in 2012. While attitudes to the police have remained 
relatively constant, the introduction of new police powers and intentional efforts 
by the current authorities to downplay some of the positive outcomes of reforms 
by the previous government put police reputation under threat. One problem is 
the new stop and search powers introduced at the beginning of 2014. These 
powers coincide with a decrease in public confidence in police according to 
International Republican Institute polls. The last survey under the previous 
authorities was conducted in June-July 2012 and it shows that 88% of 
respondents viewed police work favourably. A February 2014 survey however 
shows that the number of the respondents favourable to police work had 
decreased to 82% (Agenda 2014). NDI (National Democractic Institute) studies 
of public attitudes also reveal this. In an August 2012 survey 58% of respondents 
viewed the performance of police work as ‘very well’ or ‘well’ while in a similar 
survey of August 2014 this number had decreased to 40%.  
In summary, policies of punitiveness or leniency by themselves do not 
seem to easily shift negative views of law enforcement and obligations to the law 
regardless of how much those policies are derived from popular will. We now 
turn, finally, to a possible explanation for the entrenched and persistent nature 
of negative attitudes to the law and legal institutions. Drawing from the 
literature on procedural justice, we examine the data on how individual-level 
interactions with criminal justice relate to attitudes to the law. We suggest that 
macro-level signals of punitiveness or leniency are less important for promoting 
the rule of law, if these are not followed by fair and just procedures.  
 
Procedural Justice and Trust 
 
Direct experiences of criminal justice are vitally important for fostering 
legitimacy in the system (Tyler 1990; Jackson et al. 2012a; 2012b). When 
citizens experience neutral and transparent procedures they are more likely to 
feel compliant towards the law regardless of the particular outcome of those 
procedures. The data in the EWMI surveys show that direct experience of 
criminal justice in Georgia regularly undermines legitimacy and a sense of 
obligation to law. We examine a number of cases where this appears true 
including contact with the police and courts. We highlight the issue of procedural 
justice through a discussion of the practice of plea-bargaining introduced in 
2004. We argue that procedural justice has remained a serious problem during 
zero tolerance and after it, helping to explain the persistence of negative 
attitudes to law over time. 
Survey data show that when people actually interact with the police 
satisfaction with them declines (EWMI 2011 & 2014). This type of relationship is 
also true of the courts. The survey data for 2011 show that among people who 
themselves or close friends or relatives had been to court in the last two years, 
the perceived legitimacy of the court decision was positively related with 
mentioning obeying the law as important to being a good citizen. This held true 
in 2014 also: a greater percentage of those who viewed the court ruling as 
legitimate also mentioned that it is important to obey the law (61% n=174). Only 
45% (n=107) of those who saw their court decision as lacking legitimacy said the 
same and this was statistically significant.2 The court system was seen as lacking 
transparency. In 2007, 79% of people opposed the government decision to 
                                                 
2
X2 = 7.1, df =2, p < 0.03 
prohibit trials from being videoed (IRI 2007). In 2004-2012, acquittal rates were 
incredibly low at around 0.1% (Transparency International 2010). 
Vicarious experiences of illegitimacy and injustice also have an impact, 
particularly given the rise of social media. This is in line with other procedural 
justice studies (Jackson et al. 2012a; Singer 2013). The more frequently people 
believe innocent people are sent to prison the less likely they are to mention 
obeying the law as a citizen’s duty. In 2011, of those who believed that innocent 
people were put in prison ‘frequently’ or ‘very frequently’ only 42% (n=429) 
mention law-following as a citizen’s duty. This figure stands at 62% (n=390) for 
those who believe innocents are ‘rarely’ or ‘very rarely’ put in prison; 3 this 
relationship also held in 2014. Perceptions of the justice of opaque court 
processes and decisions then may have some effect on the strength of positive 
orientations towards law-abidingness. One practice stands out to demonstrate 
this point: plea-bargaining. 
Plea-bargaining was introduced into the Georgian system in 2004 as one 
of the earliest changes to criminal justice procedure following the Rose 
Revolution. It became the dominant practice for resolving criminal cases. Due to 
a lack of judicial independence, and the Soviet legacy of a largely inquisitorial 
court procedure, cases only go to court where there is overwhelming evidence 
that the prosecution will succeed; going to court means being found guilty. Due 
to this, plea bargains became very popular for the defence for reasons of leniency 
and for the prosecutors for reasons of efficiency. By 2012, 87% of cases ended 
with a plea (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2016). After 2012, the use of plea-
bargaining did not decline increasing to 89% in 2013 (Ibid). 
                                                 
3 The difference is statistically significant (X2 = 34.423, df = 4, p < 0.000). 
An American innovation of the nineteenth century, plea-bargaining 
arguably emerged as a means of state re-legitimation during periods of turmoil 
or following authoritarian rule (Vogel 1999; 2007). In principle, citizens are 
empowered and better able to control the judicial process through the offer of a 
plea. It is not clear what exactly motivated the adoption of plea-bargaining in 
Georgia and whether re-legitimation of the court process was a factor. Data from 
a range of sources show that it certainly did not re-legitimate the system, if that 
was ever the intention; the effect of plea-bargaining was quite the opposite. 
In 2011, respondents were asked what they thought the purpose of plea-
bargaining was. Over and above all else, respondents felt that the purpose of 
plea-bargaining was the transfer of money to the state budget (see Graph Two 
below). This was a distinct element of the practice. In the early days of plea-
bargaining, business people were held in pre-trial detention and released for a 
payment into the state budget as part of a plea (Areshidze 2007; World Bank 
2012). After the change of government in 2012, a freedom of information 
request revealed that over 140 million Georgian lari (70 million USD) had been 
transferred into the state budget in the period 2009 to 2012 from plea bargain 
agreements alone (Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information 
2013).  
This skeptical perception of plea-bargaining as an extortion has declined 
since 2012 (see Graph Two). Yet, the notion that plea-bargaining is simply a 
mechanism for speeding up trials remains (EWMI 2014). Georgians maintain a 
healthy skepticism towards the idea that plea-bargaining is in any way about 
increasing fairness or justice in the system. Given the prevalence of the practice, 
it seems a safe inference to suppose that personal or vicarious experiences of 
plea-bargaining do not increase a sense of obligation to the law. Since 2014 the 
use of plea bargaining has declined to 64% of cases, though this change comes 
too late to see if there is a correlation with changing attitudes in the EWMI 
survey data. 
 
GRAPH 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
More controversial evidence on the use of plea-bargaining and 
procedures in pre-trial detention comes from a survey of 1,199 prisoners and ex-
prisoners conducted by Open Society Georgia Foundation in 2014. This found 
widespread evidence of torture and inhuman treatment in prisons and remand 
facilities, particularly Gldani #8, a notorious pre-trial detention centre that holds 
some 3,000 people. Respondents believed that one key reason for their torture 
was to produce confessions or force plea-bargains. Respondents further 
indicated that they knew significant numbers of people who did indeed provide 
plea bargains under duress. Almost half, 48%, of respondents stated they know 
‘many’ individuals (6+) who, as a result of torture and inhuman treatment, had 
agreed to a plea bargain. Moreover, 15% of respondents claimed they had 
personally agreed to a plea bargain as a result of torture and inhuman treatment. 
Approximately every third respondent (35%) claimed to know ‘many’ 
individuals who, as a result of torture and inhuman treatment, had paid money 
or given up property to the state. Some 10% of respondents claimed they 
themselves had done this (Slade et al. 2014: 48-49).  
These results suggest that the procedures of criminal justice, from arrest 
through pre-trial detention to sentencing, were operated without due 
acknowledgement of the need for procedural justice. This did not change 
significantly after 2012, suggesting that the lack of procedural justice, rather 
than radical shifts in punitiveness accompanied by political slogans, drives 
negative feelings towards the law and criminal justice. Under zero tolerance, 
interactions with criminal justice actors were more likely, and given that these 
were often negative the overall effect was to undermine the law. However, not 
enough was done to improve these procedures after zero tolerance was relaxed, 
as even the conduct of the 2013 amnesty became contentious. Procedurally, 
Georgians do not feel their system delivers justice, regardless of how punitive or 
lenient it is. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Georgia, uniquely in a post-Soviet region marked by a trend towards 
decreasing use of prison, took a punitive turn in the early 2000s. Similar to many 
Western countries and some developing ones, politics became punitive. This 
‘politics of crime’ is familiar in contexts such as the US, the UK, Brazil, or South 
Africa (see Garland 1996; 2001; Simon 2007; Super 2010; Melossi et al. 2011). In 
these contexts the ‘criminal question’ and the ‘spectacle of crime’ (Super 2010) 
mobilized governments to focus on law enforcement as a way of tackling wider 
social ills, often due to a mixture of electoral and cultural pressures and political 
expediencies (Campbell 2015). In the Georgian case, popular punitiveness 
towards corruption and organized crime in the Rose Revolution of 2003 
morphed into elite punitiveness towards all forms of deviance around 2006. This 
change was framed in the internationalized slogan of ‘zero tolerance’. This in 
turn added to societal disillusionment that, in part at least, contributed to a 
change of government and a radical shift towards decarceration from 2013 
onwards. Georgia truly has been then, as Saakashvili put it, a ‘laboratory for 
reform.’ 
This paper has examined a number of sources - crime surveys, opinion 
polls and focus group data - to look at what has happened to attitudes to the law 
during these radical shifts in punitiveness. The available data suggest that 
negative attitudes to the law and to concrete law enforcement bodies have 
persisted, some improvements to attitudes to the police notwithstanding, since 
2004 regardless of grand punitive and lenient turns. Analysis of two surveys 
conducted in 2011 and 2014 across the change of government in 2012 and 
relaxation of zero tolerance show that punitiveness itself appears to have little 
effect on public attitudes. There was no mental revolution towards the law under 
zero tolerance; however, equally, rapid liberalization of punishment in the form 
of mass amnesty also did not produce one.  
This suggests that the outcome of a criminal trial is not as important for 
attitudes to law as the procedure of that trial. The quality of individual-level 
interactions with criminal justice agents have an effect on the belief in law-
following as a civic duty generally and trust in criminal justice institutions 
specifically. Interaction effects in the Georgian case are almost uniformly 
negative. This emerges from practices that followed opaque, partisan and unjust 
procedures such as the use of duress and violence in detention, murky processes 
of plea-bargaining, and mandatory custodial sentencing carried out by politically 
subordinate judges.  
These findings relate strongly to broader criminological discussions in 
vastly different contexts. For example, Pratt (2008) finds that in New Zealand 
very popular punitiveness required continuing engagement with legitimacy-
building. As in Georgia, scandal in the execution of punishment quickly turned 
punitiveness unpopular. The procedural justice literature provides examples 
from around the world of how attitudes to law depend on procedural fairness in 
criminal justice systems (Tyler 1990; Tankebe 2008; Jackson et al. 2012a); this 
seems highly pertinent to Georgia. Visible and tangible procedural justice both in 
the making and application of the law may be one remedy to legal nihilism. The 
relationship between direct experience of criminal justice and legal nihilism in 
Georgia and the post-Soviet region should be more fully explored with survey 
and interview questions expressly intended to test constitutive elements of 
procedural justice such as transparency, fairness and neutrality as well as more 
pointed questions concerning attitudes to the law.  
The Georgian case shows that punitive turns or politically-driven mass 
amnesties are unlikely to solve the problem of legal nihilism in the post-Soviet 
region. Opaque amnesties are often used as legitimating moves by unpopular or 
increasingly authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, the political potential to 
shift towards punitiveness, popular or otherwise, is present too. The region is an 
area where violent crime rates remain high and social norms often take 
prevalence over the law (Ledeneva 1998; 2006; Galligan & Kurkchiyan 2003). 
Despite recent decreases, the post-Soviet region maintains some of the highest 
prison populations per capita in the world. The historical use of the prison to 
stimulate economic development and stymy social problems during the Soviet 
period provides a model that can be tempting to return to, albeit under different 
modernizing and westernizing slogans such as zero tolerance. The case study of 
Georgia reveals that punitiveness is not a simple solution to the problems of 
social disorder and legal nihilism. Nor is it the most appropriate way to signal the 
supremacy of the law to society through strict non-discretionary application of 
tough criminal sanctions. Equally, liberalization under conditions of mass 
amnesty without due attention to procedure is more likely to entrench or even 
proliferate negative attitudes to the law than it is to ameliorate them. 
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Graph 1 to show favourability to court workings from 2004-2007  
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Graph 2 to show beliefs about the purpose of plea-bargaining. Source EWMI 2011 
& 2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
